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Equality has been at the center of ECLAC´s analysis of the region since structuralist 
times. In those pioneering writings, the distribution of assets and the concentration 
of power in the hands of elites were crucial aspects to understand (the lack of) 
equality in the region. Following this tradition, the last three documents that the 
institution submitted for consideration by the Governments of Latin America and 
the Caribbean at its three last sessions have put equality back in the center of the 
regional agenda, expanding the conception of equality beyond distributive fair-
ness—whose scope tends to be confined to the distribution of transferable, quantifi-
able resources—taking in other dimensions and considering equality in a “relational” 
context of socialization, autonomy, and recognition.
As put forth in Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (ECLAC 2010), the 
quest for equality is part of the drive to abolish privileges and establish equal rights 
for all individuals, regardless of origin, affiliations, or position in society. It calls not 
only for universal civil and political rights but also for advancing towards distributive 
justice in which everyone enjoys the benefits of progress. Time for equality argued 
that equality stands at the crossroads between economic growth, social inclusion, and 
recognition of diversity, advocating a kind of development that forges a positive link 
between greater equality and gains in productivity, capacities, and sustainable 
growth. The document postulated that social equality and the kind of economic dyna-
mism that transform production patterns are not at odds with each other and that the 
challenge is to find synergies between the two. The growth strategy should include 
less structural heterogeneity and more productive development, and the pursuit of 
equality through the enhancement of human capacities and the mobilization of state 
energies. The basic idea is the need of building more cohesive societies around pro-
ductive dynamics, constructing positive social and territorial synergies, and strength-
ening the protection of individuals through improvements in labor markets.
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The economic content of this approach was further developed in Structural 
Change for Equality: An Integrated Vision of Development (ECLAC 2012), which 
understands structural change as the path leading to greater equality. In this vision, 
structural change means putting qualitative changes in the production structure at 
the centre of the growth dynamic. Improved global insertion and virtuous growth 
in domestic productivity and employment call for greater participation by knowl-
edge-intensive sectors in overall production. This fosters the building of capaci-
ties, knowledge, and learning in coordination with production and investment 
across the economy. For the region, structural change must take place on two 
interconnected fronts: enhancing the share of more knowledge-intensive sectors 
in production and trade, and diversifying towards sectors where domestic and 
external demand is expanding rapidly, so that demand can be met with domestic 
supply and imports and exports can grow in a balanced manner without putting 
unsustainable pressure on the balance of payments. By centering growth on the 
creation of new sectors and the dissemination of technology throughout the 
system, structural change creates job opportunities in higher productivity sectors 
while pushing labor market participation rates up and unemployment and informal-
ity rates down. In the long run, this strategy would lead to poverty and inequality 
reduction. When the production structure is very polarized, purely redistributive 
fiscal and social mechanisms do not solve the problems of inequality and slow 
growth in the long run. Sooner than later, policies will have to target the generation 
of job and training opportunities in the framework of structural change. The adop-
tion of industrial policies that encourage this transformation should be considered, 
along with social policies, as they are key dimensions of the equality horizon. 
For example, production linkages are part of structural change; they prevent con-
centration and disseminate gains throughout society. Conversely, social and redis-
tributive policies should accompany industrial policy. For one, they improve 
distribution and reduce vulnerability in the short term, creating an intertemporal 
linkage that enables structural change-oriented policies to achieve their redistribu-
tive impacts, which are longer term. Moreover, social policy should protect the most 
disadvantaged sectors during the disruptive periods of structural change (when sec-
tor realignment can involve periods of adjustment with unemployment), as well as 
from the social impacts of external or other shocks.
The most recent session document, Compacts for equality (ECLAC 2014a), 
gets deeper into the concept of equality that ECLAC wants to promote, stating 
that it includes equality of means, opportunities, and capacities, but in the frame-
work of a deeper understanding of equality as the equal dignity of citizens, in 
which individuals are simultaneously autonomous and vulnerable and should be 
acknowledged for both qualities mutually. In this framework, the document pro-
vides a detailed analysis of inequality in different dimensions in Latin America, 
arguing that equality gains in the region in the last decade are not seen in all 
dimensions but mainly confined to means, most notably income inequality. The 
document also points to warning signs relating to structural components that drive 
inequality, both  productive and social. Although many improvements took place, 
the main warning signs refer to the absence of structural changes mainly in the 
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production sectors, but also in some aspects of social sectors. The closing part of 
the document focuses on how strategic visions of a more egalitarian and sustain-
able development can be built into the rationale for collective accords between 
stakeholders.
Embracing a broader conception of equality which goes beyond means or 
resources does not imply at all that resource inequality is considered unimportant 
in ECLAC’s view. Indeed, alongside its history, ECLAC has contributed substan-
tially to the analysis and understanding of income inequality in the region, consid-
ering its determinants both in terms of structuralist theory and from the various 
perspectives developed within the institution itself. Given the scope of this volume, 
the following pages aim to reflect some of the most recent contributions from 
ECLAC in relation to the analysis of income inequality. But this is done within this 
wider scope, reinforcing different dimensions of inequality and considering the 
importance of labour market institutions. In the following sections, we first describe 
the recent evolution of income inequality in Latin America (Sect. 1) and then con-
sider the role that the labour market, and specifically the minimum wage and the 
formalization process, has had in some countries in the region (Sect. 2). We then 
turn into gender inequalities, analysing female labour participation and its poten-
tial impacts on poverty and inequality (Sect. 3). Finally, we present some conclud-
ing remarks (Sect. 4).
1  Recent Evolution of Income Inequality in Latin America
Inequality in resource distribution, and specifically in income distribution, is one 
distinguishing feature of Latin America. Recent comparisons of Gini coefficients 
on household consumption per capita calculated for developing regions do con-
firm that the median Gini is higher in Latin America and the Caribbean, although 
the mean Gini is slightly lower than in sub-Saharan Africa (Alvaredo and 
Gasparini 2015). In any case, the levels of inequality are high for almost every 
country in the region, and undoubtedly inequality is a persistent characteristic of 
LAC.
In the last 15 years, income inequality has shown a significant decrease. 
This decline in inequality derives from higher income growth at lower income 
percentiles in the region. Figure 1 illustrates this evolution, based on pooled country- 
specific household data for 18 countries. We consider two alternative exchange rates 
to convert national currencies into a common numeraire: purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rates, and ECLAC poverty lines for each country. For both vari-
ables, income growth has been significantly higher among lower income house-
holds, consistently with the important reduction in income poverty that the region 
experimented in this period (see ECLAC 2014b).
Inequality in Latin America: ECLAC’s Perspective
288
If we turn into inequality by country, in all countries in the region, with the 
exception of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala, household surveys 
report a decrease in the Gini coefficient of household per capita income between 
2002 and 2013 (Table 1). The decreased trend is present when data for 2009 is con-
sidered, and continues for most countries for the latest available data. The magni-
tude of the decline has been differential by countries, with decreases above 5 % in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. All other measures of income inequality show a 
similar pattern of statistically significant reduction in inequality (see ECLAC 2013, 
2014b) among others.
Abundant research has tried to understand the distributive turnaround in Latin 
America. A microeconometric decomposition exercise presented by ECLAC (2011) 
notes that income per adult, and specifically earnings, was the main factor in the fall 
in inequality. The demographic factor was found to have had a modest effect on 
inequality, as the dependency ratio fell fairly evenly across all income levels. On the 
basis of an analysis of four middle-income countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Peru), López-Calva and Lustig (2010) conclude that two main factors 
account for the easing inequality in the countries: a narrowing of the wage gap 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and, to a lesser extent, an increase in 
government transfers to the lowest income households. This leads them to assert that 
in the famous “race between education and technology”, to use Tinbergen’s (1975) 
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Fig. 1 Latin America: Growth incidence curve of household per capita income 2002–2012. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries, and 
World Development Indicators
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supply in the 1990s, the opposite appears to have happened in the past few years. 
Azevedo et al. (2013), analysing the employed population in 15 countries of the 
region, also conclude that the decline in the education premium has been driven by 
a greater supply of skilled workers.
A different view is put forward by Gasparini et al. (2012), who estimate the rela-
tive contribution of supply and demand factors to recent trends in the education 
premium in 16 countries of Latin America. They show that the relative supply of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers has been increasing since the 1990s. In both the 
1990s and the 2000s, the returns on completion of secondary education diminished, 
while the returns on tertiary education increased in the 1990s but declined again in 
the 2000s. These authors argue that the rise in the skilled labour supply is not the 
only factor explaining the recent decline in inequality, and that the slowdown in 
relative demand for skilled labour in the last decade has also played a role. This shift 
in relative demand for workers with tertiary education appears to be a result of the 
commodity price surge, which has boosted demand for unskilled labour and driven 
down the education wage premium. De la Torre and Pienknagura (2012) also stress 
the importance of labour market changes, with workers moving from manufacturing 
sectors to service-intensive sectors tied to natural-resource-related production. The 
Table 1 Income inequality in Latin America













Argentinaa 0.578 0.510 0.475 −1.8 −1.8 −4.8
Bolivia 0.614 0.508 0.472 −2.7 −1.8 −6.4
Brazil 0.634 0.576 0.553 −1.4 −1.0 −3.4
Chile 0.552 0.524 0.509 −0.7 −0.7 −2.0
Colombia 0.567 0.553 0.536 −0.4 −0.8 −1.4
Costa Rica 0.488 0.501 0.512 0.4 0.5 1.2
Ecuador 0.539 0.500 0.477 −1.1 −1.2 −3.0
El Salvador 0.525 0.478 0.453 −1.3 −1.3 −3.6
Guatemala 0.542 0.585 1.1
Honduras 0.588 0.554 0.573 −0.8 0.8 −0.6
Mexico 0.514 0.515 0.492 0.0 −1.1 −1.1
Nicaragua 0.579 0.478 −2.7
Panama 0.567 0.526 0.527 −1.1 0.0 −1.8
Paraguay 0.563 0.512 0.522 −1.3 0.5 −1.9
Peru 0.530 0.469 0.444 −1.7 −1.4 −4.3
Dominican Rep. 0.537 0.574 0.544 1.0 −1.3 0.3
Uruguaya 0.455 0.446 0.380 −0.3 −3.9 −4.4
Venezuela 0.500 0.416 0.407 −2.6 −0.5 −5.0
AL (simple average) 0.548 0.513 0.492 −1.0 −1.0 −2.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys in the respective countries
aUrban areas
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case studies presented in Cornia (2014) also show that the recent drop in inequality 
in the region has been facilitated by the commodity price boom, especially in the 
countries whose exports are most commodity intensive. It is argued that this has not 
been the only cause, however, as inequality has also been falling in countries that 
are semi-industrialized or heavily dependent on remittances.
These findings are disturbing, to say the least. They suggest that a situation 
could be occurring in which sectoral composition, heavily influenced as it is by 
natural- resource- centred economies, is generating greater relative demand for low-
skilled workers, narrowing the gap in returns on education. Rather than a sign of 
development being reconciled with equality, this would be a warning that the com-
bination of stagnating productivity and the region’s specialization pattern is send-
ing out signals that discourage educational progression and capability development. 
While this evidence is not yet conclusive and the debate is still open, it is necessary 
to consider this possible scenario and assess the potential implications of this inter-
pretation of the region’s recent decline in inequality. This recent story reminds us 
about the importance of the productive structure in the determination of income 
inequality.
It is also relevant to consider the political dynamic behind the recent decline in 
inequality in the region. Democratic life has given rise to new electoral preferences 
and brought social demands to greater prominence. This means that, in a positive 
cycle of economic stability, governments respond to these demands for social inclusion 
with new, more redistributive policies. In most cases, these are reforms inspired by 
the idea of “prudent redistribution with growth” (Cornia 2010) by way of fiscal, 
employment, and progressive transfer policies. Indeed, the fiscal system has gener-
ally become more redistributive than it was, although its contribution in this area 
remains limited.
Redistributive policies and social reforms have not been the sole preserve of 
left- wing governments in the region; rather, the institutionalization of electoral 
competition in contexts of pronounced economic and social inequality seems to 
have led parties and governments of different ideological stripes to strive to 
respond to popular demands for equality and social inclusion (Roberts 2014). In 
some of the countries of the region, labour market institutions do seem to have 
played a key role, although it has been mainly neglected by most of the related 
literature. As the next section discusses, some important changes in labour mar-
ket institutions and dynamics may have played a key role in some specific 
countries.
2  Inequality and Labour Market Institutions
As discussed in the previous section, recent explanations for declining inequality in 
the region have focused on factors driving supply and demand for workers at differ-
ent qualification levels. Some recent research from ECLAC suggests the importance 
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of considering, in addition, the role of labour institutions in the distributive improve-
ments in some countries of the region. Narrowing wage differentials could indeed 
be affected, in some countries of the region, by strengthening the minimum wage 
and other tools, such as formalization in the labour market. The following para-
graphs, based on ECLAC (2014a) and Amarante and Arim (2015), provide some 
insights about the role of labour market institutions in the recent decline in wage 
inequality in the region.
2.1  Inequality and Minimum Wage
The potential effects of minimum wage hikes on labour market variables are contro-
versial (see ECLAC 2014a). Given the fact that in some countries in the region the 
minimum wage rose and wage inequality declined simultaneously in a context of 
employment growth, it is important to assess the potential link between both fea-
tures. In the following paragraphs we report some results presented in ECLAC 
(2014a) which illustrate the effects of minimum wage increases in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay (three countries where recovery of the minimum wage has 
been substantial) and Chile (where growth has been less striking).1
In Argentina, the minimum wage had remained at the same low nominal and 
real value since 1993 and plummeted in 2002. A forceful minimum wage updating 
policy was rolled out in 2003, leading to a sharp real increase of more than 200 % 
between 2008 and 2012. But this uptrend faltered in 2007 as accelerating inflation 
ate into the gains in minimum wage purchasing power (Fig. 2).2 In Brazil, recov-
ery began earlier than in Argentina, towards the mid-1990s, but really gathered 
momentum in the 2000s as the minimum wage rose around 100 % in real terms 
between 2000 and 2012. The trend was similar, albeit less marked, in Chile, which 
posted an increase of about 40 % over the same period. And Uruguay, the last 
country in which income inequality began to trend downwards, was also the last 
to start bolstering the minimum wage. The real value of the minimum wage in 
Uruguay had been dropping steadily in recent decades. The slide reversed in late 
2004, with the purchasing power of the minimum wage soaring 180 % between 
2005 and 2012.
The ability of governments to use the minimum wage as a labour policy instru-
ment depends on the extent to which the economy is indexed to the minimum 
wage. Brazil and Uruguay are two cases in which the minimum wage has been 
linked to social benefits. In Brazil, under the 1988 Constitution, the minimum 
wage is the threshold for social benefits. In Uruguay, until 2004, the minimum 
wage was the reference point for determining eligibility for and the value of a 
1 These results are based on Maurizio (2013). It should be noted that this analysis covers countries with 
relatively low levels of informality in the region. In countries with highly informal economies, the mini-
mum wage can influence informal sector wages more and tend to maintain segmentation barriers.
2 Real variation is calculated using a weighted index of price indices for the provinces.
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comprehensive package of social benefits, with the resulting fiscal impacts. The 
real minimum wage in Uruguay had to be de-indexed first before it could be increased. 
By contrast, Argentina and Chile do not use the minimum wage for setting other 
wage levels or social benefits, so raising it does not lead directly to higher fiscal 
costs.
The relationship between the minimum wages and salaries actually paid in each 
economy is tracked in Table 2 using the ratio between the minimum wage and vari-
ous measures of distribution (average wage, the median (Kaitz index), and the lowest 
wage distribution percentiles). In the countries reviewed, the minimum wage repre-
sents approximately 50 % of the median for the most recent year, except in Uruguay 










Argentina 2003 0.30 0.39 0.79 0.61
2012 0.47 0.53 1.06 0.81
Brazil 2003 0.25 0.44 0.88 0.65
2011 0.30 0.50 0.86 0.72
Chile 2000 0.31 0.49 0.92 0.82
2011 0.37 0.60 0.84 0.82
Uruguay 2004 0.13 0.18 0.43 0.31
2012 0.30 0.37 0.74 0.59
Source: ECLAC (2014a)
Fig. 2 Latin America (selected countries): Change in the real minimum wage, 2000–2012. (Local 
currencies, constant prices at latest observation.) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), on the basis of 
official data for the minimum wage and consumer price index (CPI) from countries
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where the ratio is lower. In all countries, the minimum wage recovered more sharply 
than did other pay scale indicators, driving the ratios up. This indicates that the mini-
mum wage has become more “operational” for all of the countries. Argentina has 
the highest minimum wage (equivalent to tenth-percentile wages). Uruguay has the 
lowest (74 % of tenth-percentile wages).
For the minimum wage to play its role properly, it must not only be appropri-
ate in relation to the wage distribution—but it must also be complied with. In this 
regard, it is useful to break down employment by minimum wage brackets for the 
years taken for the simulation set out below.3 About 8 % of wage workers in 
Argentina were drawing less than the legal minimum wage in 2012, and a similar 
portion were at or near the minimum wage. The remaining 84 % were earning 
wages above the figure established by law. Among participants in the pension 
system (referred to here as formal workers), only 2 % were below the minimum; 
this figure climbs to 27 % for informal workers. The proportion of formal work-
ers in the area of the minimum wage was very low (4 %), while 20 % of informal 
workers were in that range. This means that in 2012, 94 % of the reported work-
ers were earning more than the statutory minimum wage. This figure was almost 
100 % in 2003 because the minimum wage was very low, making it completely 
non-binding.
In Brazil, compliance with the minimum wage seems to be higher than in the 
other three cases. In 2011, only 1.3 % of wage workers were paid less than the mini-
mum; 8 % were at or near the minimum wage (Table 3). Therefore, 90 % of the 
workforce had incomes above the minimum wage. The percentage of unreported 
workers whose wages were below the minimum is also very low (8.3 %), signifi-
cantly lower than, for example, in Argentina (27 %). Moreover, in Brazil the distri-
bution of workers (wage earners and non-wage earners) with reference to the 
minimum wage has not changed substantially, even during a period when the mini-
mum was strengthened considerably. This suggests that in Brazil the minimum 
wage is a reference value for setting wages for informal workers. Thus, minimum 
wage hikes translate into  effective wage increases for them, confirming prior evi-
dence of the “lighthouse effect”.4 In Chile, about 3 % of the wage-earning workforce 
is paid less than the legal minimum wage; a similar percentage is at or near that 
threshold. Together with Brazil, Chile has the lowest percentage of informal work-
ers earning less than the minimum wage. But Chile also has a small percentage of 
these workers (around 7.5 %) at or near the minimum wage.
Lastly, Uruguay has the highest percentage (95 %) of wage workers drawing 
more than the minimum wage; only 3 % are below it. This reflects the fact that 
almost all reported workers are wage workers. However, when it comes to informal 
workers, Uruguay is somewhere in the middle, with about 20 % drawing less than 
3 The following criteria were used to determine whether workers were above, at, or below the mini-
mum wage for any given value: (1) below the minimum wage—less than 90 % of the value set by 
law; (2) at or near the minimum wage—between 90 and 110 % of the legal minimum wage; and (3) 
above the minimum wage—equal to or greater than 110 % of the legal minimum wage.
4 Neri et al. (2000) and Lemos (2004).
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the minimum wage. This is twice the number in Chile and Brazil and 7 percentage 
points below Argentina.
So, the differences among the four countries with regard to the distribution of 
wage workers by minimum wage brackets reflect largely the situation for informal 
workers because the percentage of formal workers at or near the minimum wage is 
similar and very low in all four cases. Between 94 and 97 % of formal workers earn 
more than the legal minimum wage.
The impact of changes in the minimum wage on wage inequality is estimated using 
the methodology proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). By estimating counterfactual 
density functions, it assesses what the wage distribution would have been at the 
starting point if, keeping worker attributes constant, the minimum wage were the one 
in force at the endpoint. This new counterfactual distribution is then used to estimate 
wage inequality indicators such as the Gini coefficient, Theil index, and percentile 
ratios. Simulating changes in the minimum wage alone while holding other potential 
causes of distributional change constant makes it possible to deduce the distributive 
impact of an increase in the minimum wage by comparing inequality indicators at the 
starting point with those resulting from the simulation.5
The key findings are set out in Table 4. The first and third columns show the 
starting and final value of the average wage (expressed in the currency of each 
country, at beginning-of-period prices), the percentile ratios (percentile 90/percen-
tile 10, percentile 50/percentile 10, and percentile 90/percentile 50), the Gini coef-
ficient, and the Theil index. The second column shows counterfactual density, 
which is the one that would have prevailed at the beginning if the minimum wage 
at the starting point had been the one at the endpoint. Thus, the difference between 
column 1 and column 2 shows the impact attributable to the change in the mini-
mum wage (absolute and relative variation). In all cases the increase in the mini-
mum wage drove the average wage up by between 1 and 4 %, depending on the 
country. In all of the cases there is also evidence that the minimum wage has an 
equalizing impact, although this impact is not significant in Chile. In Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay, the drop in inequality is explained solely by compression at 
the lower end of the distribution.
In Chile, none of the slight decreases in all of these indicators (except for vari-
ance) were statistically significant. The real increase in the minimum wage in 
Chile was, at some 30 %, lower than the 100–200 % seen in the other countries 
reviewed. This could be one of the reasons why the rise was not enough to signifi-
cantly alter the inequality indicators, which changed only marginally in absolute 
terms. And in Chile, unlike the other countries, the minimum wage seemed to lose 
5 See Maurizio (2014) for a more detailed discussion of methodological aspects. One of the limita-
tions of this methodology is that it excludes potential negative impacts on the employment rate. 
However, employment grew sharply during this period in the countries under review, with a 
marked gain in formalization (except for Chile). A sustained rise in employment and in formal jobs 
would seem to suggest that increasing the minimum wage would not have had an adverse impact 
on employment. On the other hand, only those individuals with income below the minimum wage 
would be affected by any change. This lack of spillover effects points to conservative outcomes 
because the impacts could be larger if the intensity of the minimum wage effects decreased across 
the distribution.
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effectiveness during the second part of the subject period. As noted above, Chile 
is the only country where the percentage of wage workers earning one minimum 
wage or less is lower in year one than in the final year. Meanwhile, the minimum-
wage-to-first-percentile ratio declined sharply over the past few years.
In Argentina, the increase in the real minimum wage seems to be associated with 
a 2.6 percentage point drop in the Gini coefficient, equating to a 7 % decline in this 
indicator compared with the initial year. About one-third of the decline in the Gini 
coefficient between 2003 and 2012 is attributable to changes in the minimum wage. 
Something similar is true of the Theil index. The ratio between the median and the 
90th percentile does not change, but the percentile 50/percentile 10 gap narrows 
significantly, reflecting compression in the lower income brackets.
In Brazil, the Gini coefficient fell by 2.4 percentage points (5 %). The rise in 
the minimum wage has a very significant impact, accounting for 84 % of the total 
drop in the Gini. As in Argentina, the equalizing impact is seen only at the bottom 
of the distribution. Unlike in the case of Argentina, however, the decrease is large 
enough to significantly narrow the gap between the outlier percentiles, 90 and 10. 
The results suggest that with the minimum wage effect alone, the ratio between 
percentile 50 and percentile 10 of the end year would have been even lower than 
was actually recorded.
In Uruguay, the equalizing effects were smaller than in the two other cases. 
The Gini coefficient fell 0.5 percentage points; changes in the minimum wage 
accounted for some 7 % of the total decline in the Gini between 2004 and 2012. 
Outcomes for the Theil index were similar. Once again, the narrowing of the gap 
between the outlier percentiles of the distribution reflects only the impact at the low 
end, where the portion attributable to this factor was 77 %.
2.2  Inequality and Formality
A recent study for five Latin American countries (see Amarante and Arim 2015) 
performs a statistical decomposition of inequality measures, in order to separate 
what part of their changes can be attributed to changes in the distribution of observ-
able worker characteristics (composition effect) and what part obeys to changes in 
returns to characteristics (price effect). Five countries are considered—Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay—and the potential roles of human capital and 
labor informality are explored. The main finding that arises from the joint analysis 
of the five countries under consideration is that labour formalization, together with 
the combination of norms and institutional mechanisms that determine wage cre-
ation in the formal sector, contributed significantly to the decrease of inequality in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century in some countries of the region.
The recent body of literature investing the evolution of wage inequality over the 
last 15 years has identified the reduction of wage differentials conditional on educa-
tion levels as the main factor explaining the recent fall. The results of the 
 microeconometric decomposition exercises conducted in Amarante and Arim 
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(2015) confirm the importance of this factor. However, changes in terms of formal-
ization levels and wage differentials between formal and informal workers are fac-
tors as important in magnitude as returns to education and changes in workers’ 
education levels—although there is high variation across the countries studied.
In the following table, results from these national studies are summarized. 
Tables 5 presents changes in informality (lack of contribution to the social secu-
rity) and wage inequality for employees in the five countries, and then displays the 
Gini index decomposition highlighting the effects of formality and education. A 
large portion of the informality reduction observed in the five countries is explained 
by the impact of formality and returns to working in the formal sector. Indeed, the 
total impact of formality accounts for a fall of the Gini index that ranges from 2.8 
percentage points in Argentina to 9 percentage points in Uruguay. In all countries 
except Chile, the total equalizing effect of formalization is higher than that of edu-
cation. A differential pattern is observed in Chile, where changes in inequality and 
in the degree of formalization were of minor magnitude. In this country, even when 
the increase in the number of formal workers leads to greater equality, this impact is 
offset by the higher wage differential in favour of formal workers, and the overall 
effect of formalization ends up being unequalizing (increase of the Gini by 0.5).
In all five countries, the increase in labour formality—captured by the disaggre-
gation of the composition effect (row A)—has an equalizing effect, although it var-
ies in magnitude. The countries where the decrease in informality was the highest 
(Ecuador, Brazil, and Uruguay) exhibit a major impact. In all three cases, it 
Table 5 Decomposition of the Gini index
Argentina Brazil Chile Ecuador Uruguay
Informality 
(employees)
First year 40 % 35 % 37 % 63 % 36 %
Final year 33 % 23 % 31 % 47 % 24 %
Total change −7 % −12 % −6 % −16 % −12 %
Gini (wages) First year 0.414 0.529 0.413 0.441 0.410
Final year 0.353 0.482 0.394 0.372 0.351
Total change −0.061 −0.047 −0.019 −0.069 −0.059
Composition 
effect
Total 0.001 0.031 0.020 −0.011 −0.010
Formalization (A) −0.008 −0.030 −0.006 −0.028 −0.020
Education (C) 0.004 0.055 0.016 0.013 0.010
Others 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.000
Return effects Total −0.062 −0.077 −0.024 −0.079 −0.062
Formalization (B) −0.020 −0.002 0.011 −0.064 −0.030
Education (D) −0.025 −0.049 0.024 −0.007 −0.040
Others −0.017 −0.026 −0.059 −0.008 0.008
Total effect of 
formality
(A + B) −0.028 −0.032 0.005 −0.092 −0.050
% of Total change 46 % 68 % −26 % 133 % 85 %
Total effect of 
education
(C + D) −0.021 0.006 0.040 0.006 −0.030
% of Total change 34 % −13 % −211 % −9 % 51 %
Source: Amarante and Arim (2015)
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 represents three percentage points of the Gini index. In contrast, the impact of the 
increase in employees’ education level is of the opposite sign, thus leading to high 
levels of dispersion in wages.
As for the decrease in the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors 
(row B, return effect), it favours low levels of inequality in all countries except 
Chile, where it has a concentrating effect. The equalizing impact of the return effect 
is particularly significant in Ecuador, which is directly followed by Uruguay and 
Argentina. The fall in wage differentials conditional on education levels leads to a 
decrease in inequality, again with the exception of Chile.6
Why does the reduction of informality appear to be such an important channel to 
reduce wage inequality? Figure 3 which displays the marginal impact of having a 
6 The case of Chile differs from others insofar a systematic reduction of returns to education is not 
observed. In particular, the gap between workers who have completed their tertiary education and 
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Fig. 3 Marginal unconditional effect from being a formal worker, by deciles. Source: Amarante 
and Arim (2015)
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formal worker status for given deciles of the wage distribution, gives some hints to 
this question. In almost all cases, the returns to being in the formal sector appear to 
decrease monotonically with the decile. Given this pattern of marginal effects, a 
marginal increase in the degree of formalization is expected to have a greater impact 
in the lower parts of the distribution. In other words, these patterns are the reason 
why the composition effect associated with formalization results in an equalizing 
factor.
3  Gender and Inequality
Inequalities are generated in various dimensions of the market, in connection with 
variables such as income, participation, and access to different occupations. Not 
only does the labour market offer an unparalleled space for social relations, mutual 
recognition, and building autonomy and identity, it is also one of the arenas in which 
the struggle to overcome poverty and extend citizenship plays out, making it a cru-
cial sphere for advancing towards the goal of equality. Several studies on the 
region’s labour markets show significant changes in female labour force participa-
tion in recent decades. However, these changes have taken place at different rates in 
each country, and even among women in the same country, depending on their 
socioeconomic status, their education level, and the number of dependent minors in 
their households, among other factors. In the last decade, most countries have nar-
rowed their gender gaps in labour participation and employment; yet these remain 
wide despite the fact that in the same period women overcame the educational dis-
advantages that were long considered the reason for their limited and poor labour 
market integration. With respect to income gaps and occupational segregation, the 
picture is more diverse across the countries and cannot be painted as one of progress 
for the region as a whole (ECLAC 2014b).
It is necessary to reduce gaps in participation, employment, and income, and to 
introduce policies for reconciling work and family life for men and women, as 
doing so will have positive effects at different levels. For one, there will be produc-
tivity gains, higher household income, and lower levels of socioeconomic inequality 
and household poverty. But it will also give impetus to equality in other spheres, 
such as the full exercise of autonomy, development of individual capacities and 
potential, access to contributory social protection, and broader participation in soci-
ety beyond the household. All of these are central issues on the region’s equality and 
rights agenda. A chapter in the recent Social Panorama (ECLAC 2014b) considers 
the gender inequalities in labour market and household income inequalities in the 
region. It examines the impact of women’s employment on household well-being, 
measured in terms of their income and the distribution of that income. The following 
paragraphs are based on that chapter.
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3.1  Participation, Employment, and Unemployment
In the last decade, the overall participation rate in Latin America has held relatively 
steady, notwithstanding small fluctuations in different countries. The female partici-
pation rate, despite losing some momentum in relation to previous decades, contin-
ued to show moderate growth in some countries. Yet even with those increases in 
labour force participation, a third of working-age women still have no income of 
their own (ECLAC 2014a) and are classified for statistical purposes as economi-
cally inactive, regardless of their high workloads associated with their domestic 
responsibilities. Meanwhile, the growth in labour force participation rates for men 
has been less pronounced (see Fig. 4).
On the back of these developments, the gender participation gap has narrowed in 
most countries (ECLAC 2014b) (see Fig. 5). In 2002, the weighted average female 
participation rate was 63 % of the rate for men, rising to 67 % in 2012. Although the 
gap has narrowed, it nevertheless remains significant (Fig. 6). For example, the 
female participation rate in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua is on average half 
the male rate, and even in countries where the gap is smaller, the participation rate 
for women falls short of 80 % of the rate for men (this is the case in Peru, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Uruguay). This means that, despite the consider-
able differences between the countries, there remains a broad scope for increasing 
women’s labour market participation in all cases.
The moderate economic growth in the last decade has led to declines in the 
unemployment rate for both men and women. In aggregate terms for the region, 
the female-to-male unemployment ratio held relatively steady, although there are 
significant variations between countries in a context of low regional unemployment 
rates. However, in all countries of the region unemployment rates are significantly 
higher for women than for men (see ECLAC 2014b). As a result of these develop-
ments, the gender gap in employment between men and women has narrowed 
significantly, although broad differences still remain in all countries, as is the case 
for participation (see Figs. 4 and 5). On average for the region, the female employ-
ment rate stood at 65 % of the male employment rate in 2012, compared with 61 % 
in 2002. The largest gender gaps in employment were found in Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua (see ECLAC 2014b).
3.2  Labour Income of Women and Men
A persistent feature of the region’s labour markets is the systematic discrepancy 
between the average wages earned by men and women. In all countries of the region, 
women’s average monthly earnings are lower than men’s (see Fig. 7). The gaps vary 
significantly between countries: in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru men 
earn on average over 50 % more per month than women, but in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Panama this difference is less than 10 %. This gap may in part be attributable to 
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the lower number of hours that women devote to paid work per month compared with 
men. Indeed, in 2012, men spent an average of 8 h per week more than women on 
paid work. But even when this factor is taken into account, there remains a consider-
able difference in average earnings by sex in most countries, although the gap does 
narrow somewhat. As in the case for monthly earnings, the largest gaps in hourly 
earnings to the detriment of women are seen in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
Peru. In some countries, such as Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Fig. 4 Latin America (18 countries): Female and male labour force participation rates, around 
2002 and 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. aWeighted average
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Nicaragua, wage differentials tend to disappear when controlling for hours worked. 
This means that in these countries, women’s average hourly earnings are not lower 
than men’s (and are even higher in some cases) (Fig. 7).
Differences in participation rates, employment, and wages between men and 
























































































































Fig. 5 Latin America (18 countries): Female-to-male participation ratio, around 2002 and 2012. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (b), on the basis of special 





































Fig. 6 Latin America (18 countries): Female and male participation rates, around 2012 
(Percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries. aWeighted average
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less to household income than male earnings. Indeed, women consistently account 
for less than half of total household labour income. In fact, that proportion fell 
short of 40 % in all of the countries in the region in 2012. Women make the largest 
proportional contribution in Uruguay, furnishing 39 % on average of total house-
hold earnings, and the smallest in Dominican Republic, where their share is 26 % 
(see Fig. 8).
Even greater heterogeneity is detected in the region regarding women’s contribu-































































































































































































































Fig. 7 Latin America (18 countries): Difference between average wages for men and women, 
around 2012 (percentages of female income). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries
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Women’s share of household labour income in the lowest quintiles ranges between 
9 and 34 %, averaging 26 %. Meanwhile, in the highest income quintile in each coun-
try, women’s contribution exceeds 29 % in all cases and averages 36 % (see Fig. 9). 
The significantly smaller share in the lowest quintile may reflect the reduced labour 
















































































































Fig. 8 Latin America (18 countries): Women’s contribution to total household labour income, 
around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 


















































































































Fig. 9 Latin America (18 countries): Women’s contribution to total household labour income in 
the first and fifth income quintiles, around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from house-
hold surveys conducted in the respective countries
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There is therefore scope for increasing women’s contribution to household 
income, either by expanding their labour market participation or by eliminating 
wage discrimination. Depending on the starting position of each country, the 
greatest gains can be achieved by advancing on one of these two fronts, although 
they are obviously not mutually exclusive. The next section examines the potential 
gains to be made, with the aim of promoting the formulation of public policies that 
are  conducive to greater equality. The two scenarios taken into consideration 
would lead to advances in development for the countries and in the exercise of 
women’s rights.
3.3  Women’s Labour Income and Its Effects on Inequality 
and Poverty
Previously we have examined the profound differences and inequalities in the 
employment and earnings of men and women, showing that there is scope for 
improvement in terms of greater equality in these two dimensions, which will result 
in increased household well-being, and a more level playing field for men and 
women with regard to resource availability and economic capacities, and in the 
exercise of their social and economic rights. We now turn into quantifying the prog-
ress that could be made on some basic well-being indicators (namely the levels of 
socioeconomic inequality and poverty) if advances in gender equality were made in 
the region’s labour markets.
In particular, it sets out to ascertain what the levels of income inequality and 
poverty would be in the region in two scenarios: (1) if the participation gap between 
men and women was closed, and (2) if women earned the same as men (with the 
same qualifications). The aim is to reflect on what the contribution of female earn-
ings to overall household well-being could be if women’s labour participation 
increased or the wage gap narrowed. The simulations are based on the latest infor-
mation available from household surveys conducted in the respective countries, 
which in most cases corresponds to 2012.
Setting out to close these gaps is not a utopian exercise. The fact that these 
disparities are ingrained in multiple mechanisms of cultural reproduction may make 
them difficult to reverse, but international experience has showed that public policies 
on labour and care have much to contribute in these areas.
3.3.1  Closing the Participation Gap
The first analysis looked at what would happen if the participation rate for women 
in the intermediate age group (14–65 years) was similar to that for men. The first 
step was to develop a model of the female participation rate in order to better under-
stand the variables determining women’s participation and to be able to predict the 
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probability of each woman actively entering the labour market.7 The exercise essen-
tially consisted in simulating the incorporation of inactive women into the labour 
market, sorting them according to the probability predicted using the estimated 
model of labour force participation, and matching the female participation rates to 
the male rates by age group.8 That is, the women simulated as entering the labour 
market were those of the inactive group who were deemed most likely to become 
active. Once the participation gap had been closed, the probability of these newly 
active women being employed or unemployed was predicted, assuming a constant 
rate of female unemployment (that is, the percentage of unemployed women as a 
share of active women did not vary).9 A labour income was calculated for the 
women who were simulated as gaining employment, similar to the earnings of other 
women with the same characteristics (age and education level). A new vector of 
female earnings and household income was thus obtained, having knock-on effects 
on levels of household income, poverty, and inequality.
The simulation introduced significant changes in the participation rates for 
women by age group, almost closing the participation gaps between men and 
women (see Fig. 10).
7 A probit model was estimated using the female participation rate as the dependent binary variable.
8 The following age groups were considered: 15–24 years, 25–49 years, and 50–65 years. The labour 
force participation of women aged 65 years and older is not altered (that is, if they were originally 
active, they remain so).
9 A second scenario was estimated matching both the participation rates and unemployment rates 
for men and women, thus closing the employment gap. As the results were very similar (although 
slightly higher) to those for the scenario of closing the participation gap, a decision was taken not 
to present them. The finding was attributable mainly to the low levels of unemployment recorded 
















































































































Fig. 10 Latin America (18 countries): Participation rates for men (observed) and women (observed 
and simulated), around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys con-
ducted in the respective countries
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Such a rise in the female participation rate would lead to an increase in average 
household income ranging from 3 to 4 % in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Uruguay, and reaching over 10 % in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Peru. The countries with the largest gender gap in participation rates would gain the 
most in terms of average household income if those participation gaps disappeared. 
Evening up the rates of female and male participation would reduce poverty and 
inequality in the countries. The massive incorporation of women into the labour 
market could be expected to lead to declines in the poverty rate ranging from 1 per-
centage point in Argentina and Uruguay to over 10 percentage points in El Salvador 








































With labour participation gap eliminated






















































































































































































Fig. 11 Latin America (18 countries): Poverty and inequality levels as a result of closing the 
labour participation gap compared with a baseline scenario (percentages). Source: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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the labour market it would help reduce inequality, measured using the Gini index, 
by 4 percentage points in Nicaragua and Panama, and by 3 percentage points in the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay. The Theil 
index would drop sharply in some countries (6–8 percentage points in Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay) because this measure of inequality is 
particularly sensitive to movements in the lower income segments and these 
 countries would see a large increase in the proportion of women with lower levels 
of education entering the labour market.
The above findings show that if more women were to enter the labour market, 
great strides would be made in reducing poverty and inequality, with the most sub-
stantial progress being seen in the countries with the widest participation gaps, such 
as those in Central America. It is clear, however, that even the massive incorporation 
of women into the labour market would not eliminate poverty in Latin America 
owing to the structural characteristics of the region’s labour markets. The income 
that these women would earn would help to improve their situation, but only to 
some extent. Nevertheless, some countries would register very significant progress, 
especially with regard to inequality. Even more importantly, the entry of women 
into the labour market would have a profound impact in terms of the full exercise of 
autonomy, the development of capacities and personal potential, access to contribu-
tory social protection, and broader participation in society.
Table 6 Latin America (18 countries): changes in poverty rates and inequality indicators as a 
result of closing the labour participation gap (percentage points)
Country Poverty Gini index Theil index
Argentina −1 −2 −4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −5 −1 −3
Brazil −3 −2 −5
Chile −3 −2 −5
Colombia −4 −2 −3
Costa Rica −4 −2 −4
Dominican Republic −6 −3 −5
Ecuador −9 −3 −5
El Salvador −12 −3 −5
Guatemala −5 −2 −6
Honduras −7 −3 −8
Mexico −4 −1 −2
Nicaragua −12 −4 −7
Panama −7 −4 −8
Paraguay −6 −3 −6
Peru −6 −1 −1
Uruguay −1 −1 −1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −4 −2 −2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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Accelerating changes in the proposed sense would clearly not be possible with-
out active, resolute policies that promote and encourage such changes, including 
policies on care. The region has much ground to cover in this respect, because 
although progress has been made on a legal and regulatory front, scant substantial 
changes have been seen. Care services generally have low coverage and operate in 
a weak institutional framework, thus failing to meet the growing needs of societies. 
Nevertheless, several countries have incorporated the issue into their policy agen-
das and have made different degrees of progress (ECLAC 2012a). Active labour 
market policies can encourage greater participation by women in the labour market 
by helping to ensure that they are properly qualified and by facilitating their labour 
market integration. Of course, there are other policies that can influence the female 
participation rate, such as the provision of preschool education and extended 
schooldays at the primary stage. Lastly, as ECLAC has highlighted in several 
studies, what is needed is a new gender compact that involves a more equitable 
distribution of roles within the household and is thus conducive to female labour 
force participation.
3.3.2  Closing the Income Gap
The second question addressed was what would happen to poverty and inequality in 
the region if the income gap between men and women disappeared. In the simula-
tions carried out for this purpose, a decision was taken to eliminate the monthly 
income gap between men and women, which also effaced the differences in hours 
worked. The first step was to estimate wage equations for employed men. The 
monthly earnings of women were then predicted using the coefficients of these 
equations. This calculation removed the gender differences in labour market returns 
and assumed that men and women receive equal pay in the market according to their 
education level and age.
Closing the gender income gap would lead to milestone achievements in poverty 
reduction in countries such as the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru (see 
Table 7 and Fig. 12) by significantly boosting household income. As noted above, a 
significant percentage of women in these countries are employed but not paid, 
which explains the dramatic changes that would take place if these women were to 
receive a similar income to men with the same level of education and work experi-
ence. The changes to the poverty level in Colombia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua would 
also be very significant. The Gini index would fall by between 2 and 8 percentage 
points, depending on the country, and the Theil index would mark an even larger 
decline in inequality, being more sensitive to the changes that occur in lower income 
households.
Again, the quest for progress on this front calls for public policy. Governments 
in the region have ratified international agreements and passed domestic legislation 
to endorse the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination between 
women and men. However, the figures indicate that these actions alone are insuffi-
cient to ensure the eradication of gender discrimination in the labour market. Once 
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specific legislation on equal pay has been enacted, labour market institutions can 
play a role in helping to close gaps. Expanding the coverage of collective bargaining 
to include workers in traditionally excluded sectors, such as domestic workers, rural 
workers, and home workers, can help to narrow the gender income gap. Another 
approach is to address issues relating to the protection of maternal and paternal 
labour rights (see Maurizio 2010). Improving labour inspections can also help to 
eliminate discriminatory practices. Furthermore, as several studies have indicated 
that occupational segregation is responsible for a significant part of the gender wage 
gap (for example, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995), policies to address occupational 
segregation, for example, by training women for occupations that are not considered 
typically female, would narrow the wage gap. Similarly, little progress has been 
made to date on extending training to men for occupations that have traditionally 
been considered female with a view to eliminating the stereotypes and prejudices 
that also translate into wage discrepancies.
Table 7 Latin America (18 countries): Changes in poverty rates and inequality indicators as a 
result of closing the gender income gap (percentage points)
Country Poverty Gini index Theil index
Argentina −1 −3 −5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −14 −8 −12
Brazil −6 −4 −13
Chile −2 −4 −8
Colombia −9 −5 −12
Costa Rica −4 −3 −7
Dominican Republic −5 −3 −6
Ecuador −8 −4 −8
El Salvador −6 −3 −5
Guatemala −4 −2 −7
Honduras −1 −2 −6
Mexico −5 −3 −6
Nicaragua −8 −4 −8
Panama −6 −4 −10
Paraguay −7 −5 −12
Peru −8 −5 −8
Uruguay −2 −3 −4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −4 −2 −3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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4  Final Remarks
ECLAC has consistently promoted and reiterated the idea that the region should 
move towards the horizon of equality, understood in a broad sense. This chapter has 
summarized some recent studies from ECLAC which show that, even if very impor-
tant advances were made during the last 15 years, inequality continues to be a major 
problem in the region. The labor market has a fundamental role to understand 








































Labour participation gap eliminated






















































































































































































Fig. 12 Latin America (18 countries): Poverty and inequality levels as a result of eliminating the 
gender income gap compared with a baseline scenario (percentages). Source: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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of the region responds to institutional factors, such as increases of the minimum 
wage and formalization in the labour market. Strengthening labour market institu-
tions as well as implementing strategies for achieving gender equality are necessary 
actions in order to achieve higher equality.
 Annex (see Table A.1)
Table A.1 Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita. Developing 
countries. 2010
Mean Median Coef. var. Min. Max.
East Asia and Pacific 38.1 36.7 0.101 31.9 43.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 33.6 33.7 0.144 25.6 43.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 43.8 44.8 0.104 34.7 52.8
Middle East and North Africa 36.0 36.1 0.091 30.8 40.9
South Asia 35.0 36.3 0.081 30 38.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.4 42.1 0.175 33.3 63.1
Developing countries 39.8 39.2 0.181 25.6 63.1
Note: Unweighted statistics
Source: Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015)
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